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FEDERAL TAXATION: SUPREME COURT DISAPPROVES
TREASURY REGULATION'S IMPOSITION OF FRACTIONAL
OR PERCENTILE SHARE REQUIREMENT ON SECTION
2056 (b)(5) MARITAL DEDUCTION
S ECiON 2056 (b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 pro-
vides that a bequest to a decedent's spouse of a life estate with a power
of appointment qualifies for the estate tax marital deduction if the
surviving spouse is entitled to all the income for life and has the
general power to appoint the entire interest, or is entitled to all of
the income from a specific portion thereof for life with the general
power to appoint such specific portion. In Northeastern Pennsyl-
vania National Bank & Trust Company v. United States2 the Su-
preme Court held that a widow's right to fixed monthly payments
from a testamentary trust was a deductible interest within the "spe-
cific portion" language of this section of the Code. Under de-
cedent's will, his widow was to receive $300 per month, to be paid
from the income and, if necessary, corpus of the trust. In addition,
the widow was given a general power of appointment over the entire
corpus. Reasoning that there was no method of evaluation avail-
able which could satisfactorily isolate the "specific portion" of the
corpus from which the widow had the right to all the income, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit approved the Commissioner's
disallowance of a marital deduction for the trust,3 after the estate
had won a refund in the district court.4 The Supreme Court re-
versed, concluding that the relationship between the monthly stipend
and the monthly income which would be generated by the corpus
if invested at a normal rate of trust return adequately defined a
"specific portion" of the corpus for section 2056 purposes.
The marital deduction was introduced into the estate tax5 in an
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (5).
'387 U.S. 213 (1967).
Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir.
1966), noted in 35 FORDaAm L. REv. 553 (1967); 55 ILL. B.J. 516 (1967); 51 MINN. L. REv.
568 (1967); 19 STAN. L. REv. 468 (1967); and 18 W. RFs. L. REv. 996 (1967).
'Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D.
Pa. 1964).
"Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2056).
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effort to extend the advantages of two-stage taxation enjoyed by
married couples in community property states to citizens in common
law jurisdictions.6 Under the provisions of section 2056, interests
transferred in fee to a surviving spouse are deductible from a de-
cedent's gross estate, as are both legal and equitable life estates, if
the surviving spouse has been given the right to "all the income"
from, and a general power of appointment over, the entire interest
or a "specific portion" thereof.7 This legislative allowance of the
marital deduction was constricted by the Treasury Department Reg-
ulation providing that a partial interest could not qualify as a
"specific portion" unless "the rights of the surviving spouse in income
and as to the power constitute a fractional or percentile share of a
property interest." s  Further, if the income or power of appoint-
ment were limited to a specific sum, the interest was not deductible
under explicit language of the Treasury's pronouncement., This
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "all the income from a
specific portion" was based on the theory that the share of a sur-
viving spouse must reflect its proportionate part of the increment or
decline in the value of the property interest so that any change
during the life of the surviving spouse may be reflected in the amout
to be included in her gross estate at death.10
The threshold case dealing with the definition of "specific por-
tion," Gelb v. Commissioner," rejected the Treasury's fractional
or percentile share requirement and indicated that "specific por-
tion" included any designation of interest from which the deduc-
tion could feasibly be computed.'2 In Gelb a widow was given the
entire income generated by a trust established by her deceased
husband, with a testamentary power to appoint the entire corpus to
a See, e.g., United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963); S. REp. No. 1013, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 26-29 (1948); H.R. REp. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Ses. 24-26
(1948); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 2.4, 11.14 (2d ed.
1962). See also Anderson, The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes Between Common Law and Community Property States, 54
MicH. L. REv. 1087 (1956).
T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (5).
8 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-5 (c) (1958).
9 Id.
10 See id.; Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction: A Procvustean Bed of Per-
plexities, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 319, 325 nA6 (1965).
1 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
2  See generally C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 407
(Ist ed. 1956) (reached same conclusion, but before regulations were issued).
anyone or to her estate, subject, however, to discretionary invasion
by the trustees of up to $5,000 each year for the benefit of the
decedent's child. The court allowed a deduction of the amount of
the corpus less the value of the maximum yearly invasion capitalized
over the joint lives of the surviving spouse and the child. This
interpretation of section 2056 (b) (5) was followed in Allen v. United
States,13 in which the court allowed a marital deduction where the
surviving spouse was entitled to receive the entire trust income
and had the power to invade the corpus to the extent of $5,000 per
year. While the Allen court did not expressly consider the problem
of computation, it did limit the deduction to $5,000, the amount
which the widow had the power to appoint in the year of her
death, and which would be included in her estate for tax purposes.
14
Against this background of explicit judicial rejection of the Com-
missioner's position, the Seventh Circuit decided Citizens National
Bank v. United States,'5 a case substantially identical to that before
the Supreme Court in Northeastern. Relying on Gelb, the Seventh
Circuit allowed the deduction of a sum which would have provided,
according to Treasury tables,' 6 the stipulated monthly payments for
the life expectancy of the surviving spouse. In the Northeastern
case, however, the Third Circuit, while apparently agreeing that a
"specific portion" need not be a fractional share, found no acceptable
means of ascertaining the portion of the corpus from which the
survivor was entitled to all the income, and, therefore, disallowed
the deduction.
Considering resolution of the conflict between circuit court
decisions to be "essentially a matter of discovering the intent of
Congress," the Supreme Court turned to the legislative history
of the marital deduction to test the validity of the Commissioner's
Regulation. 7 The Court indicated that absent specific legislative
authority for the "fractional or percentile share" requirement, the
regulation could not stand since it was inconsistent with the gen-
eral intent of Congress to provide a liberal estate-splitting possi-
bility free from arbitary technicalities. It was argued by the
"8 250 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Mo. 1965). See also Flesher v. United States, 238 F. Supp.
119 (N.D.WV. Va. 1965).
14 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
'* 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967).
10 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 (f) (1958) (Table I).
17 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056 (b)-5 (c) (1958).
FEDERAL TAXATION 1263Vol. 1967: 1261]
Government that explicit in the Senate report's description of the
surviving spouse as "virtual owner" of the deductible interest,18 and
implicit in the underlying legislative purpose to achieve equality in
tax treatment in community property and common law jurisdictions,
was the concept that the deduction be allowed only for the equiva-
lent of outright ownership, one of the incidents of which is income
fluctuation. In response, the Court interpreted congressional intent
to require only that the surviving spouse's right to income and
power over corpus be such that the unconsumed remainder of the
deductible portion of the decedent's estate would ultimately be
taxable to the estate of the survivor. Where, as in the instant case,
this legislative requirement has been satisfied, a denial of the deduc-
tion because of difficulty in computation could only be characterized
as a technical forfeiture of the type which the "specific portion"
provision was designed to eliminate. Refuting the Third Circuit's
conclusion that the computation could not be made because of the
uncertainty of market conditions, the Supreme Court decided that
in light of the widespread use of projected rates of return in the
administration of federal tax laws,19 a rate of return available to a
trustee under normal investment conditions could be employed to
compute the "specific portion" of the corpus necessary to produce
the monthly stipend contemplated by the will. Thus, the de-
ductible portion was to be computed by first determining the ratio
of the fixed monthly stipend to the projected monthly income of the
corpus invested at a normal rate of trust return; this ratio was then
to be multiplied by the value of the corpus.
Allowance of the marital deduction in the present case, where
the unconsumed trust property will be taxed to the widow's estate
by virtue of her general power of appointment over the entire
corpus,20 not only comports with Congress' intent to provide a liberal
estate-splitting possibility for persons in common law states,21 but
also fully satisfies the rationale of the administrative regulation: any
change in property value during the widow's life will be reflected in
the estate tax incurred at her death. Furthermore, the result en-
ables estate planners to guarantee the surviving spouse's income
Is S. RFe. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 16 (1948).
29 See Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551 n.7 (2d Cir. 1962).
20INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2041.
"Authorities cited note 6 supra.
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regardless of investment conditions, while achieving the maximum
benefits of the marital deduction. 22  Requiring closer scrutiny is
the method of computation employed by the Court. The annuity
valuation used by the district court,23 and by the Seventh Circuit in
Citizens,24 to determine the amount of the deduction was sum-
marily dismissed by the Supreme Court in Northeastern as "in-
correct." Because this method anticipates dissipation of the entire
fund over the life expectancy of the beneficiary, it produces a result
seemingly not contemplated by the decedent, despite the will pro-
vision allowing invasion of corpus if trust income should ever be
insufficient to provide the fixed stipends. Similarly, the annuity
concept is inconsistent with section 2056 (b) (5) which allows a deduc-
tion for the "specific portion" of corpus from which the spouse is
entitled to regular payments of "all the income." Since annuity pay-
ments include elements of both income and principal, annuity valu-
ation is not relevant to a determination of what "specific portion" of
corpus would produce a specified income per month.
While the annuity valuation method concerns itself with the
present value of the widow's interest in receiving a fixed income-
for life, the Northeastern method computes the amount of the
corpus over which the widow possesses the requisite characteristics
of fee ownership. Only this latter method can produce a conceptually
satisfactory valuation; for under section 2056(b) (5) it is not the value
of the widow's rights, but the specific portion of the corpus over
which she may exercise those rights that qualifies for the deduction.
The method here approved is not an innovation of this Court but
finds judicial precedent in estate tax cases25 involving transfers with
retained life estates.26 In these cases the courts, like the Supreme
Court in Northeastern, have been concerned with valuation of the
portion of a trust necessary to produce periodic payments of a fixed
amount, situations sufficiently analogous to the instant case to fur-
nish significant support for the Court's choice of method. Neverthe-
22 19 Sw. L.J. 426, 427 (1965). See generally Lovell, Marital Deduction Simplified,
93 TRusTs & ESTATES 760, 761-62 (1954).
23 235 F. Supp. at 944 n.4.
21359 F.2d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967). See notes
15-16 supra and accompanying text.
25 In re Estate of Uhl, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957); see Industrial Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 165 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1947).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
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less, the potential significance of this case is limited by its failure
to furnish a generally applicable replacement for the disapproved
administrative definition of "specific portion." Instead, by refusing
to consider the "quite different problem" of possible tax avoidance
that would be presented by an extension of this method to situations
involving a power of appointment over a fixed dollar amount,27 the
Supreme Court has left the door open to yet another round of in-
terpretive litigation in the lower courts.
27 87 U.S. at 225-28 (Stewart, Black, & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
